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1. INTRODUCTION
Section 161(v) of the Atomic Energy Act of 19541 authorizes the
federal government to provide utility companies with "enrichment" ser-
vices, which constitute one step in the process of transforming uranium2
into nuclear reactor fuel.3 However, Section 161(v) also requires the
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1 Section 161(v) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. § 2201(v) (1982 &
Supp. III 1983), was enacted as part of the Private Ownership of Special Nuclear
Materials Act, Pub. L. No. 88-489, 78 Stat. 602 (1964) (codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
2 Uranium is a silvery-white radioactive metal. Prior to the advent of nuclear
weaponry, uranium was used to create steel, copper, and nickel alloys as well as the
yellow to brown colors in the production of glass and ceramics. Uranium mining was
also used to recover the associated elements of radium and vanadium, which are used,
respectively, in medicine and metallurgy. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMIN., URANIUM
INDUSTRY ANNUAL 1986 2 (1987) [hereinafter URANIUM ANNUAL 1986].
Today, over 90% of the uranium produced and sold in the United States is used
for the generation of electric power. U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, SUMMARY OF TRADE
AND TARIFF INFORMATION: URANIUM AND URANIUM COMPOUNDS iv (1981) [herein-
after TRADE SUMMARY]. Although four other natural resources (coal, oil, gas, and
water) are also used to fuel the generation of electricity, uranium is arguably more
effective. Id. at 13. Energy generated by 14,000 pounds of coal, for example, can be
generated by only one pound of uranium. URANIUM ANNUAL 1986, at 2.
' Enrichment is one of six steps necessary to harness uranium for use as nuclear
fuel: (1) Exploration. Exploration of the earth's crust for uranium deposits is com-
monly conducted by drilling, or sometimes by measuring underground radioactivity at
prospective uranium sites; (2) Mining. Uranium is mined by physically extracting the
ore in which uranium is found, either from open pits or from underground mines.
Uranium is also mined in situ, whereby uranium concentrate, basically uranium oxide
(U30 8), is chemically extracted from the ground without physically extracting the ore;
(3) Milling. Uranium mined in situ does not undergo the milling process since it is
already in the form of uranium concentrate upon extraction. However, uranium ore is
milled in order to separate the uranium concentrate from the rock in which it is embed-
ded; (4) Conversion. After milling, uranium concentrate is converted to uranium hex-
afluoride (UF 6), a compound that contains fissionable isotopes (isotopes that can be
split in order to release energy); (5) Enrichment. Uranium hexafluoride then undergoes
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government to restrict its enrichment of foreign-source uranium in-
tended for use in U.S. facilities "to the extent necessary to assure the
maintenance of a viable domestic uranium industry."' 4 In 1974, after
restricting enrichment of foreign-source uranium for six years,5 the
government began to phase out its restrictions.' When the phase out
was completed in 1984, three domestic uranium mining and milling
companies brought suit against the Department of Energy (DOE).7
Several months later, the Secretary of Energy determined that the do-
mestic uranium industry was not viable.' However, because the nature
of the international uranium market had significantly changed since the
enactment of Section 161(v), he stated that the DOE would not reim-
pose enrichment restrictions on foreign-source uranium.9 The Secretary
asserted that such restrictions were not required as they would not
achieve the objective of Section 161(v), restoring viability to the domes-
tic industry.10
In Huffman v. Western Nuclear, Inc.,"' the litigants disagreed as
to whether Section 161(v) requires mandatory action by the DOE
when the domestic uranium industry is not viable. The uranium com-
panies argued that Section 161(v) requires the DOE to restrict its en-
richment of foreign-source uranium whenever the domestic industry is
not viable.1" The DOE asserted that Section 161(v) requires it to im-
pose enrichment restrictions only when such restrictions would restore
viability to the domestic industry. The Supreme Court ruled in favor
enrichment, a process that increases the concentration of fissionable isotopes to a level
that can sustain a nuclear chain reaction in a nuclear reactor; and (6) Fabrication.
After the uranium hexafluoride is enriched, it is fabricated into fuel rods. These rods
are shipped to nuclear power plants where they are used as nuclear reactor fuel. See
URANIUM ANNUAL 1986, supra note 2, at 3.
4 42 U.S.C. § 2201(v) (1982).
' See Uranium Enrichment Services Notice, 31 Fed. Reg. 16,479 (1966).
' See Foreign Uranium for Domestic Use-Modifications of Restrictions on En-
richment Notice, 39 Fed. Reg. 38,016 (1974) [hereinafter Modifications of Restrictions
Notice].
' The case was initially brought in the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Colorado and then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit before being heard by the Supreme Court. Huffman v. Western Nuclear,
Inc., 108 S. Ct. 2091 (1988).
1 ENERGY INFORMATION ADMIN., DOMESTIC URANIUM MINING AND MILLING
INDUSTRY: 1986 VIABILITY ASSESSMENT ix (1987) [hereinafter 1986 VIABILITY As-
SESSMENT]. See also ENERGY INFORMATION ADMIN., U.S. DEPT. OF ENERGY, Do-
MESTIC URANIUM MINING AND MILLING INDUSTRY: 1984 VIABILITY ASSESSMENT
(September 1985) [hereinafter 1984 VIABILITY ASSESSMENT].
I See Uranium Enrichment Services Criteria, 10 C.F.R. § 762 (1989).
10 Id.
11 108 S. Ct. 2087 (1988).
12 Id. at 2092.
13 Id.
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of the DOE, requiring it to impose restrictions only when such restric-
tions would restore the industry's viability. 4
This article examines Huffman in the context of the domestic ura-
nium industry's past and future. Part 2 of the article examines the
causes of the litigation and their relationship both to the long term de-
velopment of the domestic industry as well as to more recent events.
Part 3 discusses the arguments made before the Supreme Court by both
parties and by amici curiae and recounts the Court's decision. Part 4
concludes by examining potential legislation that may affect the ura-
nium industry in the future.
2. FOUNDATION FOR CONFLICT
Although one can point to the government's phase out of enrich-
ment restrictions as one of the main factors leading to Huffman, the
case can also be attributed to a much deeper cause. This Part examines
both the underlying and immediate causes of the Huffman dispute.
Part 2.1 suggests that the federal government and domestic uranium
companies had historically contradictory goals for the uranium indus-
try, thus laying the foundation for conflict between the two forces from
the industry's inception. Part 2.2 analyzes the specific recent events
which led to the litigation.
2.1. Government Interest in the Domestic Uranium Industry: Nu-
clear Weaponry
2.1.1. The Atomic Energy Act of 1946
Government involvement in the uranium industry was spawned by
the advent of nuclear weapons. The Manhattan Engineering District
(MED), under the direction of the Army Corps of Engineers, headed
uranium procurement and research for the development of nuclear
weaponry in the early 1940s.15 The MED was later replaced by the
Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), created by the Atomic Energy Act
of 1946.16 The Atomic Energy Act of 1946 vested all right, title, and
interest in "fissionable material" with the AEC.' 7 The AEC was also
14 Id. at 2092-93.
'5 URANIUM ANNUAL 1986, supra note 2, at 2.
1 Atomic Energy Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 585, 60 Stat. 755.
17 Id. § 5(a)(2), 60 Stat. 760. The Act defines "fissionable material" as "pluto-
nium, uranium enriched in the isotope 235, any other material which the Commission
determines to be capable of releasing substantial quantities of energy through nuclear
chain reaction of the material, or any material artificially enriched by any of the fore-
going." Id. § 5(a)(1), 60 Stat. 760.
1989]
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made the exclusive owner of all facilities used in the production of fis-
sionable material."
8
The government's demand for uranium for military purposes liter-
ally created the domestic and foreign uranium-producing industries.1 9
Since the mechanisms for large-scale mining and milling of uranium
were not yet in place, the AEC instituted price and purchase guaran-
tees to encourage industry growth.2" The domestic industry boomed in
response to the AEC's program, as production of uranium concentrate
skyrocketed from approximately five million pounds in 1955 to nearly
thirty-five million pounds in 1960.21
2.1.2. The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and the Private Ownership of
Special Nuclear Materials Act
Once the military's immediate needs for uranium were satisfied,
Congress passed two additional acts to dissolve the government's mo-
nopoly over uranium and to foster a private nuclear energy industry.22
The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 empowered the AEC to license private
entities to own'and operate nuclear reactors.2" Nevertheless, the govern-
ment continued to be the exclusive owner of fissionable material, which
it leased to private entities. The Private Ownership of Special Nuclear
Materials Act 24 (Private Ownership Act), passed in 1964, finally al-
lowed private entities to own fissionable material. However, since the
U.S. government had the only facilities in the world at this time for
enriching uranium,25 the Private Ownership Act also authorized the
AEC to enrich privately-owned uranium for a fee.26
18 Id. § 4(c)(1), 60 Stat. 757. Two exceptions are facilities that
(A) are useful in the conduct of research and development activities in the
fields specified in section 3; and (B) do not, in the opinion of the Commis-
sion, have a potential production rate adequate to enable the operator of
such facilities to produce within a reasonable period of time a sufficient
quantity of the fissionable material to produce an atomic bomb or any
other atomic weapon.
Id.
19 1986 VIABILITY ASSESSMENT, supra note 8, at 5.
20 Id.
"' URANIUM ANNUAL 1986, supra note 2, at 42.
22 Although Congress passed the Atomic Energy Act for military purposes, it also
recognized that "tapping this new source of energy will cause profound changes in our
present way of life." Atomic Energy Act of 1946, § 1(a), 60 Stat. 755.
21 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2132-34 (1982).
24 Private Ownership of Special Nuclear Materials Act, Pub. L. No. 88-489, 78
Stat. 602 (1964) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
25 See Proposed Uranium Enrichment Services Criteria, 51 Fed. Reg. 3,624,
3,625 (1986) (codified at 10 C.F.R. § 762).
26 Pub. L. No. 88-489, 78 Stat. 602 (1964).
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The Private Ownership Act also added Section 161(v) to the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954. By requiring the government to restrict
enrichment of foreign-source uranium bound for the domestic market
"to the extent necessary to assure the maintenance of a viable domestic
uranium industry,"27 the statute was aimed at protecting the fledgling
domestic industry from foreign competition. Congress instructed the
AEC to develop "criteria" consistent with this mandate to be* used in
determining when the AEC would and would not enrich foreign-source
uranium." In 1966, the AEC issued criteria stating that it would not
enrich any foreign-source uranium bound for domestic use. 9 The AEC
stated, however, that it would periodically review the condition of the
domestic industry to determine whether this restriction should be modi-
fied or removed.30
As these acts transferred the uranium industry to the private sec-
tor, the AEC simultaneously reduced its uranium purchase program."'
Consequently, the rapidly expanding industry declined, as it was sud-
denly deprived of its major purchaser at a time when there was not yet
a commercial market to absorb its production potential. 2 Production
fell from nearly thirty-five million pounds in 1960 to approximately
twenty-one million pounds in 1965." 8 However, this trend reversed
when a commercial market for uranium took root in the mid-1960s and
blossomed in the 1970s.'4 Orders from utility companies increased, the
industry's commitment to exploration and production revived 5 and op-
timistic utilities scheduled start-up dates for new reactors. 6 In addition,
the government entered into long term contracts with utilities to supply
enrichment services."
27 42 U.S.C. § 2201(v) (1982).
28 Id.
29 See Uranium Enrichment Services Notice, supra note 5.
30 Id.
31 1986 VIABILITY ASSESSMENT, supra note 8, at 5.
32 Id.
33 URANIUM ANNUAL 1986, supra note 2, at 42.
31 1986 VIABILITY ASSESSMENT, supra note 8, at 5.
"' Id. In 1966, utility companies ordered 16.5 GWe of electricity. (One GWe is
equal to a billion watts of electrical power.) In 1967 they ordered 26.5 GWe, and in
1968, 15.9 GWe. Exploration in 1966 nearly doubled that of 1965, and exploration in
1967 and 1968 tripled that of 1966. Although utility orders temporarily dipped to 7.2
GWe in 1969, as exploration fell to 15 million feet in 1971, both rose steadily from
1971 to 1973. Utility companies ordered 21.2 GWe in 1971, 41.4 GWe in 1972, and
47.0 GWe in 1973, while exploration drilling rose to approximately 17 million feet in
1973 and peaked at 48 million feet in 1978. Id.
36 Id.
37 Id.
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2.1.3. Development in Perspective
An examination of the early development of the domestic uranium
industry suggests that the AEC's interests were inherently different
from those of the uranium mining and milling companies. While the
uranium companies were predominantly concerned with their economic
viability, the AEC was occupied with the task of implementing the pro-
visions aimed at furthering the paramount goal of the Atomic Energy
Act of 1954-ensuring the common defense and security.
Accordingly, Section 161(v) served different purposes for these
parties. For the uranium companies, Section 161(v) was an instrument
of protection. In their view, it guaranteed that the domestic industry
would not fall prey to foreign competition. For the AEC, however, Sec-
tion 161(v) was a tool by which it could control the international flow
of nuclear materials by enriching foreign uranium. While it also pro-
vided for the domestic industry's protection, Section 161(v) was primar-
ily a flexible provision that would not conflict with the ultimate objec-
tive of the Atomic Energy Act. 8 The struggle between these
approaches to Section 161(v) remained dormant until several specific
events brought them into direct and open conflict.
2.2. The Specific Events
2.2.1. Phasing Out Restrictions on the Enrichment of Foreign-
Source Uranium
In 1974, the AEC began to phase out its restrictions on enrich-
ment of foreign-source uranium. Although the AEC declared in 1966
that it would not enrich foreign-source uranium bound for the domestic
market,3 9 it re-evaluated the nature of world wide supply and demand
in the early 1970s. The AEC concluded that a gradual relaxation of
enrichment restrictions would permit the use of foreign uranium in
U.S. power reactors while "maintain[ing] the viability of the domestic
uranium industry and permit[ting] its continued growth."40 Accord-
ingly, the AEC adopted a plan providing for the enrichment of 10% of
foreign-source uranium in 1977, 15% in 1978, 20% in 1979, 30% in
S. REP. No. 1325, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 3135 (AEC can make the decision whether "to offer or refuse to offer
its enrichment services" based on "its opinion" of what action will assure the domestic
industry's viability).
s See Uranium Enrichment Services Notice, supra note 5.
40 Restrictions on Enrichment of Foreign Uranium for Domestic Use, 38 Fed.
Reg. 32,595, 32,595 (Atomic Energy Comm'n 1973).
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1980, 40% in 1981, 60% in 1982, 80% in 1983, and 100% thereafter.4 '
2.2.2. Bust Again: The Industry's Dramatic Decline
The domestic market again declined in the late 1970s. This second
decline, from which the industry has not yet recovered, was generally
due to three factors. First, in traditional economic terms, the demise of
the domestic industry was caused by "a classic oversupply situation." '42
Although the industry had begun expanding in the 1960s, by the late
1970s the projected increase in demand for uranium had not material-
ized."' U.S. consumption of electric power simply failed to conform to
its historical growth rate.44 Second, the rising costs associated with the
construction of nuclear power plants led to the delay or cancellation of
a considerable number of new nuclear facilities.45 Finally, in the mid-
1970s the AEC faced for the first time foreign competition in providing
enrichment services. Two European consortia and the Soviet Union
took away approximately sixty percent of the total foreign market for
enrichment services.46
The result was that the price of uranium dropped dramatically.47
A 1987 Nuexco report stated that oversupply, decreased demand, and
foreign competition forced down the price of uranium in new contracts
from approximately $43.70 per pound in 1979 to $14.45 per pound in
1986.48 A subsequent glut left utilities committed to long-term enrich-
ment contracts they no longer needed. 49 Accordingly, a secondary mar-
ket developed in which utilities sold their surplus "separative work
units"50 at dramatically discounted prices. 5'
4 See Modifications of Restrictions Notice, supra note 6. The percentages re-
present fractions "of feed material[s] furnished by any customer during a year under all
of the customer's enrichment agreements with the AEC that is feed material of foreign
origin ... ." Uranium Enrichment Services Notice, supra note 5.
42 Status of the Domestic Uranium Mining and Milling Industry: The Effects of
Imports: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Energy Research and Development of the
Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1981) (statement
of Shelby Brewer, Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Energy).
41 1986 VIABILITY ASSESSMENT, supra note 8, at 5.
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 See Proposed Uranium Enrichment Services Criteria, supra note 25, at 3,625.
4, Id.
4, 1986 VIABILITY ASSESSMENT, supra note 8, at 8 (citing NUEXCO, MONTHLY
REPORT ON THE NUCLEAR FUEL MARKET 29 (1987)).
41 See Proposed Uranium Enrichment Services Criteria, supra note 25, at 3,625.
"o "The capacity of plants used for producing enriched uranium is defined in
terms of separative work units. Such units measure the amount of effort expended to
separate a given amount of natural uranium into two components-one having a higher
concentration of fissionable uranium-235." Id. at 3,625 n.1.
51 Id. at 3,625.
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2.2.3. Congress: Attempting to Stem the Decline
In 1982, Congress reacted to the industry's decline by adding Sec-
tion 170B to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954,52 which calls for height-
ened scrutiny of the ailing domestic industry. It directs the Secretary of
Energy to monitor the industry for ten years, from 1983 to 1992, and to
make a formal determination of viability each year.5 3 The Secretary is
to base this determination on guidelines specified in the Act, as well as
those developed by the DOE.
5 4
The Energy Information Administration of the DOE formulated
four guidelines to be considered in conjunction with those listed by
Congress in Section 170B. These guidelines involve the industry's re-
source capability, supply response capability, financial capability and
import commitment dependency. 5 Collectively, the guidelines gauge
52 Section 170B was added to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 by the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 97-415, 96 Stat. 2067 (1982)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) [hereinafter Authorization Act].
5' Authorization Act § 23(b), 42 U.S.C. § 2210b(a) (1982). It also required the
President to conduct a one time comprehensive review of the industry and to present
that review to Congress. Id. at § 23(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2210b (1982). For the results of
that review, see U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, UNITED STATES URANIUM MINING AND
MILLING INDUSTRY: A COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW (1984).
' Authorization Act § 23(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 2210b(c) (1982). The guidelines
offered by Congress to determine the viability of the industry are as follows:
(1) an assessment of whether executed contracts or options for source ma-
terial or special nuclear material will result in greater than 37- percent
of actual or projected domestic uranium requirements for any two-consec-
utive-year period being supplied by source material or special nuclear ma-
terial from foreign sources;
(2) projections of uranium requirements and inventories of domestic utili-
ties for a 10 year period;
(3) present and probable future use of the domestic market by foreign
imports;
(4) whether domestic economic reserves can supply all future needs for a
future 10 year period;
(5) present and projected domestic uranium exploration expenditures and
plans;
(6) present and projected employment and capital investment in the ura-
nium industry;
(7) the level of domestic uranium production capacity sufficient to meet
projected domestic nuclear power needs for a 10 year period; and
(8) a projection of domestic uranium production and uranium price levels
which will be in effect under various assumptions with respect to imports.
Id.
" See Criteria to Assess Viability of Domestic Uranium Mining and Milling In-
dustry, 10 C.F.R. § 761 (1989). The guidelines were defined as follows:
Resource capability: Whether domestic economic uranium reserves can
supply all domestic needs for ten years;
Supply response capability: The level of domestic uranium production ca-
pacity sufficient to meet projected domestic nuclear power needs for ten
years;
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whether the industry "will be capable, at any particular time, of sup-
plying the needs of the domestic nuclear power industry under a variety
of hypothetical conditions." 6
Once these guidelines were formally adopted in 1984, the Secre-
tary made his first viability determination for the previous year. He
determined that the domestic industry had been viable in 1983. 57 In
1985, however, the Secretary deterrhined that the domestic industry had
not been viable in 1984.58 Similarly, in 1986, the Secretary determined
that the domestic industry had not been viable in 1985."'
2.2.4. DOE: Modifying Enrichment Criteria
In 1986, two years after the 1974 phase-out of all restrictions on
enrichment was completed, the DOE modified the criteria under which
it provided uranium enrichment services to "continue the existing pol-
icy against restrictions on the enrichment of uranium from foreign
countries for domestic use."8 Under the new criteria,
[the] DOE would negotiate individual enrichment services
contracts in accordance with an overall approach intended to
maintain the long-term competitive position of the United
States in the world market, while obtaining the recovery of
the Government's costs for providing enrichment services.
The proposed criteria would provide flexibility concerning
price, as well as other terms and conditions, in enrichment
services contracts.
6 1
The DOE adopted these criteria as part of a new program to ful-
Financial capability: The industry's ability to finance the level of produc-
tion capability defined under supply response capability; and
Import commitment dependency: Whether executed contracts or options
for source material or special nuclear material will result in greater than
37- percent of actual or projected domestic uranium requirements for
any two-consecutive-year period being supplied by source material or spe-
cial nuclear material from foreign sources.
Id.
66 Id.
57 1986 VIABILITY ASSESSMENT, supra note 8, at ix. See also ENERGY INFORMA-
TION ADMIN., U.S. DEPT. OF ENERGY, DOMESTIC URANIUM MINING AND MILLING
INDUSTRY: 1983 VIABILITY ASSESSMENT (1984).
11 1986 VIABILITY ASSESSMENT, supra note 8, at ix. See also 1984 VIABILITY
ASSESSMENT, supra note 8.
59 1986 VIABILITY ASSESSMENT, supra note 8, at ix. See also ENERGY INFORMA-
TION ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T. OF ENERGY, DOMESTIC URANIUM MINING AND MILLING
INDUSTRY: 1985 VIABILITY ASSESSMENT (1986).
"o Proposed Uranium Enrichment Services Criteria, supra note 25, at 3,624.
61 Id.
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fill its statutory requirements under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 in
light of changing market conditions.6 2 These responsibilities included
making the United States a more competitive member of the world's
marketplace as well as controlling, more effectively, the development
and utilization of atomic energy for peaceful purposes.63
While this action angered domestic uranium companies, the DOE
also took several steps to aid the industry. Not only did it offer mining
companies a free variable tails option, 4 it also had the United States
Trade Representative (USTR) study the condition of the industry. The
USTR independently determined that restriction under Section 161(v)
would not aid the industry in the long run. 5 In addition, the DOE
postponed for one year plans to feed stockpiled uranium into its enrich-
ment plants.66
3. THE CONFLICT RESOLVED
After the DOE phased out its enrichment restrictions, but before it
formally revised its enrichment criteria, several uranium companies
filed suit against the DOE, claiming it had violated Section 161(v).
That section provides as follows:
And provided further, That the Commission, to the extent
necessary to assure the maintenance of a viable domestic ura-
nium industry, shall not offer such [enrichment] services for
source or special nuclear materials of foreign origin intended
for use in a utilization facility within or under the jurisdic-
tion of the United States. 7
3.1. Arguments Made before the Supreme Court
Following litigation in the trial and appellate courts in 1984 and
62 Id.
63 Id.
6 The offering of a free variable tails option removes penalties connected with a
company's choice of uranium refinement processes. Utility companies have a choice in
how they want their uranium to be refined. The prices differ depending on the specific
process, and sometimes penalties are assigned depending on the option desired.
65 See 1986 VIABILITY ASSESSMENT, supra note 8, at ix. The USTR determined
that "any remedy granted under existing law which might provide the extent of relief
requested by the industry would only be short term, while at the same time having an
adverse impact on trade and other relations with important trading partners without
resolving the long-term problems of the industry." Proposed Uranium Enrichment Ser-
vices Criteria, supra note 25, at 3,628.
66 Id.
67 42 U.S.C. § 2201(v) (1982).
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1987, respectively,"8 the Supreme Court heard Huffman" in April
1988. The narrow issue examined by the Court was
[w]hether, regardless of the effects restrictions would have on
the viability of the domestic industry, DOE must impose re-
strictions on the enrichment of foreign-source uranium
whenever the domestic industry is determined not to be
viable.7
3.1.1. Uranium Companies (Western)
Western argued that the DOE was indeed required to impose en-
richment restrictions on foreign-source uranium during periods of do-
mestic nonviability. It asserted that in enacting Section 161(v), Con-
gress determined that restrictions on the enrichment of foreign-source
uranium are instrumental in assuring the domestic industry's viability
and, therefore, must be imposed when the industry's viability is
threatened. 1 This argument was premised on five points.
First, Western asserted that it is apparent from the plain language
of Section 161(v) that the DOE has no discretion in deciding whether
to apply enrichment restrictions. 2 Rather, Section 161(v) states that the
DOE "shall not offer" enrichment services for foreign-source ura-
68 Three domestic uranium mining and milling companies, Western Nuclear, Inc.,
Energy Fuels Nuclear, Inc., and Uranium Resources, Inc., brought suit against the
DOE on December 7, 1984, in the United States District Court for the District of
Colorado. Western Nuclear, Inc. v. Huffman, No. 84-C-2315, slip op. (D. Colo. Sept.
19, 1985). The district court granted the companies' motion for summary judgment,
holding that Section 161(v) does not allow the DOE to remove restrictions if the do-
mestic industry is not viable. See Appendix to Petition for Certiorari at 22a, Western
Nuclear Inc. v. Huffman, No. 84-C-2315, slip op. (D. Colo. Sept. 19, 1985). The court
ordered the DOE to cease the enrichment of foreign source uranium and called for a
rule to resolve the issue of whether "criteria less restrictive than those imposed by this
order would assure the maintenance of a viable domestic uranium industry." Id.
The lower court's ruling was affirmed in relevant part on appeal. Western Nu-
clear, Inc. v. Huffman, 825 F.2d 1430 (10th Cir. 1987). The court of appeals first
found that the phrase "shall not offer such [enrichment] services" is "mandatory lan-
guage." Id. at 1438. It then found that the phrase "to the extent necessary to assure the
maintenance of a viable domestic uranium industry" allows the DOE the discretion to
determine the amount of restriction required but "does not provide a scenario in which
the DOE is [altogether] excused from restricting foreign enrichment." Id. The court
emphasized that even if Section 161(v) is a bad provision, criticisms of the statute
"should be made to Congress and not to the courts. We can only apply this statute as
Congress passed it." Id. at 1,439.
"9 Huffman, 108 S. Ct. at 2087 (1988).
70 108 S. Ct. at 2091.
71 Brief for Respondents at 17, Huffman v. Western Nuclear, Inc., 108 S. Ct.
2087 (1988) (No. 87-645).
72 Id.
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nium7 3 The phrase "to the extent necessary to assure the maintenance
of a viable domestic industry" does not provide an exception to this
mandate, but rather describes the degree of restriction required.7 Ac-
cordingly, Western argued that "[u]nder the plain reading of the statute
• . . [the] DOE must restrict the enrichment of foreign-source uranium
unless and until the viability of the domestic industry is assured. '75
Second, Western argued that the legislative history of Section
161(v) indicates that Congress intended to require mandatory enrich-
ment restrictions by the AEC whenever the industry is not viable. 6
While the Private Ownership Act was under consideration, Western
asserted, representatives of the domestic uranium industry feared that
competition posed by low-cost foreign producers would make it impos-
sible for the industry to remain viable.77 Western argued that this con-
cern prompted the Vice Chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy to request an industry spokesman to propose legislation that
would protect the domestic industry.78 This legislation ultimately be-
came Section 1,61(v). 79 Supporters of the provision believed that its "re-
striction on the enrichment of foreign uranium . . .[would] protect our
industry against ruinous competition from cheap foreign uranium." 80
Third, Western argued that Congress believed that the imposition
of enrichment restrictions pursuant to Section 161(v) would in fact as-
sure the viability of the domestic industry. 8' The clear thrust of the
Private Ownership Act, Western asserted, was to promote U.S. defense
by sustaining a viable domestic industry. Congress chose to accomplish
this objective by restricting the harmful flow of foreign uranium into
this country through enrichment, as well as import, restrictions.82 As an
AEC representative testified before the Joint Committee, "[t]he com-
73 Id.
74 Id. at 18.
75 Id. at 19.
76 Id. at 21.
7 Id. at 22.
78 Id. at 23.
19 Id. The proposed legislation read in part:
That the Commission shall establish criteria in writing setting forth the
terms and conditions of making such production or enrichment services
available and, in this regard, shall not extend its services to source or spe-
cial nuclear materials of foreign origin intended for domestic use to the
extent necessary to assure the development of a viable domestic uranium
mining and milling industry.
Id. at 23 n.33 (citing Private Ownership of Special Nuclear Materials: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Legislation of the Joint Comm. on Atomic Energy, 88th Cong.,
2nd Sess. 198 (1964) [hereinafter 1964 Private Ownership Hearings]).
80 Id. at 24 (citing 110 CONG. REC. 20,145 (1964) (statement of Rep. Morris)).
81 Id. at 26.
82 Id. at 27.
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mon defense and security . . . is dependent to a degree on the viability
of our domestic mining and milling industry to provide feed material.
That was the basis in the first instance for section 161v [sic]." 83
Fourth, Western further argued that Congress added section 170B
to the Atomic Energy Act-the provision requiring the DOE to deter-
mine annually if the domestic uranium industry is viable-to prevent
the DOE from avoiding its responkibility to implement enrichment re-
strictions.84 Mining companies urged Congress to take such action be-
cause the DOE was phasing out enrichment restrictions while at the
same time making no effort to monitor the industry's viability.8 5 With
Section 170B, Congress intended the DOE to monitor the industry so
that the DOE could not simply fail to fulfill its responsibilities under
Section 161(v).
Finally, Western argued that the DOE could not avoid its obliga-
tion under Section 161(v) by claiming that the Court must respect the
DOE's interpretation of the statute.8" Unlike agencies that can choose
from a variety of methods to implement a statute, the DOE was faced
with only one method with which to implement Section 161(v). 87 This
method was to restrict the enrichment of foreign-source uranium. In
declining to do so, the DOE did not merely choose a different method
of implementing Section 161(v), but declined to implement it alto-
gether.88 Since the DOE abandoned its duties under Section 161(v) in
order to further its profitable position as an international supplier of
enrichment services,89 its position was clearly not supported by the
statute.
83 Id. at 28 (citing Proposed Modification of Restrictions on Enrichment of For-
eign Uranium for Domestic Use: Hearings Before the Joint Comm. on Atomic Energy,
93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1974) (statement of Mr. Mercer)).
84 Id. at 30.
85 Id. As Representative Lujan stated:
Congress has consistently recognized the importance of maintaining a via-
ble domestic uranium industry .... We adopted Section 161(v) of the
Atomic Energy Act directing the Atomic Energy Commission, now the
Department of Energy, to take such actions in the provision of enrichment
services as were necessary to maintain a viable domestic industry. The
Department, to my sorrow, has failed to implement that provision.
Id. (citing 128 CONG. REc. 28,538 (1982)).
86 Id. at 33.
87 Id. at 34.
88 Id.
89 Id. at 35. Western asserted that the "DOE's refusal to take any action to assure
the viability of the domestic uranium industry [was] driven by DOE's concern that, if
enrichment restrictions [were] imposed, it [might] lose some enrichment business to for-
eign competitors." Id.
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3.1.2. The Department of Energy
The DOE argued that the court of appeals had erred in interpret-
ing Section 161(v) as requiring the government to restrict its enrich-
ment of foreign uranium whenever the domestic industry was not via-
ble." It asserted that the court should have taken into consideration the
effect restrictions would have upon the industry's viability."' The DOE
made three main arguments.
First, the DOE argued that it was required to impose restrictions
only "to the extent necessary to assure the maintenance of a viable do-
mestic uranium industry."92 This mandate logically does not require
the DOE to impose restrictions in situations where no amount of re-
striction would assure viability: .if viability cannot be achieved by im-
posing restrictions, then no measure of those restrictions need be ap-
plied.9 3 The DOE asserted, therefore, that it did not violate Section
161(v) by declining to impose restrictions that would do nothing to re-
vive the industry. It stated this is "the intuitive, natural reading of the
language; it rests on a purpose that is plain on the face of the
provision.""'
90 Brief for Petitioners at 22, Huffman v. Western Nuclear, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 2087
(1988) (No. 87-645).
91 Id.
92 Id.
11 Id. Consider the DOE's explanations given in the notice of proposed rulemak-
ing to amend existing enrichment criteria:
Import restriction on foreign uranium would not assure the viability of the
domestic mining and milling industry. The difficulties currently facing the
domestic mining and milling industry appear to stem from various factors,
including the disparity between the production cost of domestic and for-
eign uranium, shrinkage in the demand for nuclear power, excess uranium
inventories, excess production capacity, and cancellation of powerplants
due to cost overrun and licensing delays.
Import restrictions would have no long term positive effect on the con-
sumption of domestic uranium. As long as DOE's enrichment services
costs are competitive with foreign services, customers will procure either
domestic or foreign uranium for feed material based solely on economic
considerations . . . .In the short-term, an import ban might increase con-
sumption of domestic uranium temporarily . . .[but] [t]his effect would be
temporary and could not assure the long-term viability of the domestic
industry.
Proposed Uranium Enrichment Services Criteria, supra note 25, at 3,627 (footnote
omitted).
04 Brief for Petitioners at 23. The DOE relied on Young v. Community Nutrition
Institute, 476 U.S. 974 (1986), in concluding that the Court should defer to its reading
of the statute. The DOE recounted that in Young, the FDA had decided not to promul-
gate regulations to implement a statute although the statute stated that the Administra-
tor "shall promulgate regulations ...to such extent as he finds necessary for the
protection of public health." The FDA argued "that the phrase 'to such extent as he
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Second, the DOE argued that the legislative history of Section
161(v) demonstrates that Congress did not intend to make restrictions
mandatory whenever the domestic industry is not viable.98 Although
Section 161(v) was enacted to protect the domestic industry as it was
being transferred to the private sector, the AEC stated, as early-as
1964, that restrictions would be removed by 1975, when "civilian re-
quirements are expected to be sufficiently high that the viability of the
domestic industry would no longer be at stake."96 The Kerr-McGee
Company, a major player in the uranium industry, had recommended
that the imposition or lifting of restrictions be based on an ongoing
evaluation of the industry rather than on an evaluation arbitrarily set
for a particular year. This aspect of the Kerr-McGee proposal was
accepted by the Joint Committee."' Furthermore, Congress did not in-
tend this provision to be unreviewable. Rather, the Joint Committee
echoed the language of the Atomic Energy Act of 1964 when it stated,
"It is recognized that many unforeseeable developments may arise in
this field requiring changes in the legislation from time to time." ' In-
deed, in enacting Section 170B in 1982 to solve a problem not foreseen
in 1964, Congress demonstrated such flexibility. It rejected mandatory
uranium import restrictions in favor of an annual viability review, an
action that allows the DOE to respond appropriately to a particular
problem "as [it] sees fit."99
Finally, the DOE argued that the court of appeals' decision was
founded on factual findings that were clearly incorrect.1 00 For example,
the court required the DOE to impose and increase restrictions on a
continuous basis during periods of nonviability until the domestic in-
dustry became viable. This ruling was based on the assumption that
restrictions would in fact lead to viability. 01 However, the district court
made no such factual finding. 0 ' Since the Secretary made unrebutted
statements that restrictions would not lead to viability, the court of ap-
peals was required to accept his assertions as true on the respondents'
finds necessary for the protection of public health' . . modified the word 'shall'." 476
U.S. at 980. The Supreme Court held that this interpretation was "sufficiently rational
to preclude a court from substituting its judgment for that of the FDA." Brief for
Petitioners at 24 (citing Young, 476 U.S. at 980-81).
,Id. at 30.
Id. at 31 (citing 1964 Private Ownership Hearings, supra note 79, at 5).
97 Id. at 32.
' Id. at 35 (citing S. REP. No. 1325, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1964)).
9 Id. at 37 (citing 128 CONG. REc. H10,463 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 1982) (remarks
of Rep. Frenzel)).
100 Id. at 38.
101 Id.
102 Id.
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motion for summary judgment." 3
3.1.3. Amici Curiae
Several amici curiae made arguments in support of either the
DOE or Western. The Government of Australia supported the DOE
by arguing in part that the lower court's interpretation of Section
161(v) violated the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT),'04 which is U.S. law. Article 111(4) of the GATT has been
construed to require that "imported goods will be accorded the same
treatment as goods of local origin with respect to matters under govern-
ment control, such as taxation and regulation."'0 5 The court of appeals'
decision, however, denied Australian uranium such treatment.'0 6 In ad-
dition, the DOE's implementation of the lower court's interpretation of
Section 161(v) would violate Article XI(1) of the GATT, which pro-
hibits U.S. imposition of restrictions "other than duties, taxes or other
charges, whether made effective through quotas, import or export li-
censes or other measures . . . on the importation of any product of the
territory of any other contracting party . . . .
The states of Arizona, Colorado, New Mexico, Nevada, Utah, and
Wyoming all supported Western, arguing that the plain language and
legislative history of Section 161(v) illustrate that Congress intended
the DOE to preserve and maintain a viable domestic industry through
mandatory restrictions.0 8 They asserted that the DOE's different inter-
pretation of the statute was based on "its self-serving conclusion" that
103 Id. at 39 (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S.
574, 587-88 (1986); United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962)). The
court of appeals could also have remanded the case for further proceedings to determine
this factual issue. However, it failed to do this as well. Id.
104 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, T.I.A.S. No. 1700,
55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
'05 Brief for the Government of Australia at 7-8, Huffman v. Western Nuclear,
Inc., 108 S. Ct. 2087 (1988) (No. 87-645) (citing J. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND
THE LAW OF GATT 273 (1969)).
106 Id. at 4, 7. Article 111(2) states in part as follows:
The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the
territory of any other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less
favourable than that accorded to like products of national origin in respect
of all laws, regulations and requirements affecting their internal sale, of-
fering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution, or use.
GATT, art. III, 12, T.I.A.S. No. 1700 at 14, 55 U.N.T.S. at 206.
107 Brief for the Government of Australia at 8-9 (emphasis added). The Govern-
ment of Canada made a similar argument in support of the DOE. See Brief for the
Government of Canada at 9-14, Huffman v. Western Nuclear, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 2087
(1988) (No. 87-645).
10' Brief of Amici Curiae States at 14, Huffman v. Western Nuclear, Inc., 108 S.
Ct. 2087 (1988) (No. 87-645).
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restrictions would not help the industry.1"9 The DOE, however, had no
legal authority to implement the statute differently from the manner
that Congress dictated."1
3.2. The Decision
The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, concluding that
Section 161(v) did not require the DOE to restrict the enrichment of
foreign-source uranium irrespective of whether restrictions would make
the domestic industry viable. The Court first found Section 161(v) am-
biguous, recognizing that the language of the statute did not state
clearly whether restrictions must always be applied, even when they
would not assure viability. 1 Consequently, the Court focused on the
purpose of the statute, namely, "to assure the maintenance of a viable
domestic uranium industry." The Court concluded
[I]t seems strained to assert that, even if DOE properly de-
termined that no amount of restriction would assure the via-
bility of the domestic industry, Congress nevertheless in-
tended DOE to impose restrictions that were somehow
calculated to serve that unattainable goal.1 2
109 Id. at 13.
110 Other amici curiae for the DOE were Eldorado Nuclear Limited, et al., and
the Governments of the Province of Saskatchewan and the Province of Ontario. These
parties asserted that Section 161(v) did not automatically require the DOE to restrict
enrichment of foreign uranium if the domestic industry were nonviable. Rather, the
DOE must do so only if such restrictions would assure viability, not when, as the
Secretary had determined, they would have been counterproductive. In addition, the
lower court's decision, if it were upheld, would have adversely affected critical U.S.-
Canadian trade relations.
Amici curiae for Western were U.S. Senators Bingaman, Domenici, et al. The
group of senators asserted that the DOE could not disregard an act of Congress merely
because it believed the statute no longer served its purpose. Such judgments should be
left to Congress. In addition, the DOE could not gauge its decision to refuse to imple-
ment the statute on its own judgment that this would damage its enrichment program.
The National Taxpayers Union (NTU) was neutral. The NTU advised the Court
of the economic ramifications of Section 161(v). It stated that "[i]f [the] DOE fail[ed] to
recover the costs of its civilian enrichment program as provided in . . . § 161v[sic], the
burden of providing enrichment services . . . [would] fall on U.S. taxpayers." Brief for
Amicus Curiae National Taxpayers Union at 2, Huffman v. Western Nuclear, Inc.,
108 S. Ct. 2087 (1988) (No. 87-645). This potential burden existed, NTU contended,
since the DOE had claimed the authority to "write off" its losses. "NTU oppose[d]
[such] write-offs as unlawful under § 161v[sic] and as an unwarranted taxpayer sub-
sidy contrary to the literal intent of § 161v[sic]." Id. at 3.
"I Huffman, 108 S. Ct. at 2092. On this issue, the Court remarked as follows:
"Indeed, we well might infer from the language that the particular issue presented by
this case was not the focus of Congress' concern at the time the relevant provision was
enacted." Id. at 2092.
11 Id. at 2092-93 (footnote omitted).
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The Court bolstered its conclusion by pointing out that the statute
did not explain how much restriction was necessary beyond the phrase
"to assure the viability of the domestic industry."11 The Court believed
that requiring the restriction of all foreign enrichment "rest[ed] on the
assumption that the greater the restrictions, the more assured . . . the
domestic industry's viability;"" 4 however, it believed that this assump-
tion was not grounded in the statutory language." 5 Accordingly, the
Court reversed.
4. LOOKING FORWARD
In the wake of Huffman, Congress has passed or considered sev-
eral measures affecting the domestic uranium industry. The Uranium
Revitalization bill, for example, sought in part,
to provide for a viable domestic uranium industry [and] . . .
to establish a wholly-owned Government corporation to
manage the Nation's uranium enrichment enterprise, operat-
ing as a continuing, commercial enterprise on a profitable
and efficient basis ....
Although it was referred to several committees, the Uranium Revitali-
zation bill and several similar bills died at the close of the 100th session
of Congress.
The most notable legislation to become law that may injure the
domestic industry is the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between the
United States and Canada." 7 The FTA creates the largest free trade
area in the world and will affect approximately 125 billion dollars
worth of trade." 8 The effects of the FTA on the domestic uranium
industry remain to be seen.
In the present session of Congress, the Senate has passed the Ura-
nium Enrichment, Uranium Security and Tailings Reclamation Act of
1989."' The Act seeks
to establish the United States Enrichment Corporation to op-
113 Id. at 2093.
114 Id.
115 Id.
111 H.R. 4934, 100th Cong., 2d. Sess., 134 CONG. REC. H4833 (1988) (proposed
Uranium Revitalization, Tailings Reclamation and Enrichment Act of 1988).
.. See United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act of 1988,
Pub. L. No. 100-449, 102 Stat. 1851 (to be codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2112). The FTA
was signed into law on September 28, 1988.
118 United States-Canada Free-Trade Agreement, done Dec. 22, 1987-Jan. 2,
1988, 27 I.L.M. 281.
119 S. 83, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 135 CONG. REc. D818 (1989).
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erate the Federal uranium enrichment program on a profita-
ble and efficient basis . . . , to provide assistance to the do-
mestic uranium industry and to provide a Federal
contribution for the reclamation of mill tailings generated
pursuant to Federal defense contracts at active uranium and
thorium processing sites.
120
Considering Huffman and the types of trade measures passed or
considered this term, what does the future hold for the domestic ura-
nium industry? It is difficult to offer a definitive answer to this query.
As the history of the uranium industry suggests, the industry's viability
is dependent on many variables. In the future, these variables may
range from the price of foreign uranium to the efficiency and safety of
domestic nuclear power plants. Although the DOE prevailed in
Huffman and although proposed legislation such as the Uranium Revi-
talization bill was rejected, interest in assuring the well-being of the
domestic industry continues. Perhaps the only prediction that can be
made with any degree of certainty is that this country's strong but con-
tradictory philosophies of free trade and protectionism assure that the
uranium industry will be the topic of conflicting legislative proposals
well into the future.
120 Id.
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